A HAPLESS WARRANT OFFICER

 

HOWEVER, like all stories there is a twist and a cupboard in

which we will find skeletons.

 

To my uncertain knowledge, what follows is unique and

disturbing.

 

A hapless FCRS, a good friend of mine, one John Bailey promoted

in September 1976 had two UNTENTABLE APPOINTMENTS IN SUCCESSION,

although both did involve Divisional Officer duties.

 

John, despite all I have said back in the main story about

training/cross training/cross sub branch-training, was actually

appointed [as his first appointment] OUT OF BRANCH, to be the

Commander’s Assistant in a Guided Missile Destroyer, a [GMD].

Being at sea is tough enough for all onboard, and the bigger the

ship and the closer to the commanding officer, the bigger the

stress problem, especially if one has not had suitable training.

This Commander started the association by stating the he had

expected a senior lieutenant or a junior lieutenant commander

and from thereon in, John’s job was, to say the least,

difficult. John had excellent management skills and ordinarily

these would have been sufficient tools with which to run the

Commander’s office. Obviously, no amount of specialist training

for any FCPO would have won-over this Commander’s opinion.

 

Shortly after this experience, John Bailey was appointed to an

aircraft carrier, not as FCRS or as a Communicator (which would

destroy my previous line on the FCPO [Comms] story) but as, of

all things, the Fleet Chief Bosun’s Mate (FCBM). If you

understand the sea-going navy, you will readily know that this

position on any ship [never mind a carrier] is a DEEP SPECIALIST

job resolving problems of RAS’s, seamanship per se, husbandry

and a whole host of seamanship duties familiar [because of

training and employment] to seamen branches but not to ANY

communicator. Appointing a Communicator was rather like

appointing a sick berth attendant as a surgeon. Notwithstanding

that John received the tacit support from the seaman senior

rates. John left the ship with an adverse report, and a travesty

of all that the navy represents – namely horses-for-courses. The

SD list brought together able officers who put behind them their

origins of branch deployment and were prepared to take on any

duty within the scope of a royal naval officer. Not so the

warrant officer who was promoted on BRANCH skills only [with

whole-man skills universal to all branches of the navy of

course, management being high on the list]. Can you imagine a

FCPO GI from Whale Island carrying out the duties of a FCRS

attached to a sea going Flag appointment, responsible for

tactical and long haul strategic communications. No, of course

not, for it would be an unreasonable task, made more prominent

and impossible by the catastrophic blunders leading to a total

failure of communications. In reality of course, the

communicators would rally round to avoid this happening, and no

credit would be given to the FCPO GI.

 

Unfortunately for John [and all communicators, though 99.9% of

them escaped this type of appointing] seamen and communicators

were grouped together as the Operations Branch [Ops Branch] and

whilst this rarely affected the drafting system of ratings in

the sub branches of the Ops Branch, it did affect the appointing

of middle managers in the Ops Branch which included FCPO’s. All

FCPO’s in the Ops Branch EXCEPT for communicators were cross

trained and employed in seamanship duties in addition to their

primary roles in Gunnery, Radar, TAS, Diving and Sail making, so

being appointed either as, for example, a FCPO GI Gunnery

Duties, or as a FCPO GI for Fleet Chief Bosun’s Mate Duties were

expected and accepted as the norm.